The nuclear safety framework in the European Union after Fukushima. Egmont Paper No. 73, December 2014

Summary. On 11 March 2011, a devastating earthquake struck Japan and caused a major nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The disaster confirmed that nuclear reactors must be protected even against accidents that have been assessed as highly unlikely. It also revealed a well-known catalogue of problems: faulty design, insufficient back-up systems, human error, inadequate contingency plans, and poor communications. The catastrophe triggered the rapid launch of a major re-examination of nuclear reactor security in Europe. It also stopped in its tracks what had appeared to be a ‘nuclear renaissance’, both in Europe and globally, especially in the emerging countries. Under the accumulated pressure of rising demand and climate warming, many new nuclear projects had been proposed. Since 2011 there has been more ambivalence, especially in Europe. Some Member States have even decided to abandon the nuclear sector altogether. This Egmont Paper aims to examine the reactions of the EU regarding nuclear safety since 2011. Firstly, a general description of the nuclear sector in Europe is provided. The nuclear production of electricity currently employs around 500,000 people, including those working in the supply chain. It generates approximately €70 billion per year. It provides roughly 30% of the electricity consumed in the EU. At the end of 2013, there were 131 nuclear power reactors active in the EU, located in 14 countries. Four new reactors are under construction in France, Slovakia and Finland. Secondly, this paper will present the Euratom legal framework regarding nuclear safety. The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) Treaty was signed in 1957, and somewhat obscured by the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. It was a more classical treaty, establishing institutions with limited powers. Its development remained relatively modest until the Chernobyl catastrophe, which provoked many initiatives. The most important was the final adoption of the Nuclear Safety Directive 2009/71. Thirdly, the general symbiosis between Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be explained. Fourthly, the paper analyses the initiatives taken by the EU in the wake of the Fukushima catastrophe. These initiatives are centred around the famous ‘stress tests’. Fifthly, the most important legal change brought about by this event was the revision of Directive 2009/71. Directive 2014/87 has been adopted quite rapidly, and has deepened in various ways the role of the EU in nuclear safety. It has reinforced the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities. It has enhanced transparency on nuclear safety matters. It has strengthened principles, and introduced new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire life cycle of nuclear installations, and in particular, nuclear power plants. It has extended monitoring and the exchange of experiences by establishing a European system of peer reviews. Finally, it has established a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonized nuclear safety guidelines. In spite of these various improvements, Directive 2014/87 Euratom still reflects the ambiguity of the Euratom system in general, and especially in the field of nuclear safety. The use of nuclear energy remains controversial among Member States. Some of them remain adamantly in favour, others against or ambivalent. The intervention of the EAEC institutions remains sensitive. The use of the traditional Community method remains limited. The peer review method remains a very peculiar mechanism that deserves more attention

Towards an audiovisual media services directive: an analysis of the Commission's proposal. Egmont European Affairs Publication, 2006

The current “Television without frontiers” (TVWF) Directive constitutes the basic regulation of the European Community’s broadcasting policy. Adopted in 1989, the Directive provides for the free movement of television broadcasting services in the Union as it requires Member States to guarantee the freedom of reception and transmission on their territory of television programmes which originate from other Member States. Consequently, the Directive harmonized certain national programming and advertising rules. With the aim of protecting the European TV market, it also introduced broadcasting quota for European and independent works. In the light of the rapid developments in the television sector, a revision of the Directive took place in 1997. Since 2002, the Commission is engaged in a new revision process in order to modernise the rules on televised services. It has also examined the possibility to extend the scope of these rules to cover all services which have an audiovisual content, including new media services delivered by Internet, email, mobile communication, etc. On 13 December 2005, the Commission eventually adopted the legislative proposal for the revision of the Directive. The aim of this paper is to analyse the Commission’s strategy in reviewing the regulatory framework. First, we will shortly discuss and evaluate the underlying principles of the present Directive. We will subsequently take a look at the elements which require a revision of the Directive. Third, we will examine the Commission’s proposal and we will conclude with some critical comments

The reform of the EU courts (IV). The Need for a Better Focus on the European Court of Justice’s Core Mission. Egmont Paper 96, September 2017

In recent years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has sometimes been accused of judicial activism, especially in Great Britain. This accusation is far from new. In 1993, Margaret Thatcher declared to the House of Lords that ‘some things at the Court are very much to our distaste’.1 Before that, Michel Debré had even evoked the Court’s ‘pathological megalomania’.2 From a technical point of view, Rasmussen published a seminal comment in the 1980s,3 and many others followed. There is now a huge volume of literature on the subject

The reform of the EU courts (II). The Brilliant Alternative Approach of the European Court of Human Rights. Egmont Paper 86, September 2016

The 2011 proposal of the European Court of Justice aiming to increase the number of judges of the General Court has mutated after four years into a complete change of the EU judicial system. This long legislative debate was the first implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the judicial domain. It has revealed different problems – formal and substantial – of the approach of public service reform in the European institutions

La réforme des cours européennes (I) : la nécessité d'une approche managériale

The structural solution proposed by the European Court of Justice appears rather costly (the 12 new cabinets) and should be considered as a last resort one. Other measures, with very little costs, could have a strong positive impact on the General Court’s productivity. Furthermore, an immediate structural reform would go against fundamental principles of management (and strategy). Before pumping more resources in a system, it is useful to analyze in depth where the existing problems come from. If a plane flies low because there are numerous leaks in the motor, one can always push much more kerosene in the motor but this is rarely seen as the optimal way to improve performance. Plugging first the leaks is widely seen as more economical. Furthermore, it is always dangerous to make immediate structural reforms with a long term impact under the pressure of urgency. Finally, in the case of a sudden rise of judicial activity in the next years (which is the working hypothesis of the debated proposals), the neglect of the productivity measures could lead to an explosion of costs. In the present hard times especially, each of us has to do his/her utmost to get more bangs from the taxpayer’s bucks. This is possible here, but it means that all parties involved (General Court’s judges and personnel, Court of Justice, Member States, budgetary authorities, and legal counsels) have to accept some limited efforts

The reform of the EU courts (II). Abandoning the management approach by doubling the General Court. Egmont Paper 83, March 2016

The 2011 proposal of the European Court of Justice aiming to increase the number of judges of the General Court has mutated after four years into a complete change of the EU judicial system. This long legislative debate was the first implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the judicial domain. It has revealed different problems – formal and substantial – of the approach of public service reform in the European institutions

The EU Climate Policy after the Climate Package and Copenhagen - Promises and Limits. Egmont Paper No. 38, September 2010

This paper aims to provide a global assessment of the European Union’s climate change policy after the Climate Package and Copenhagen. In order to do so, the paper firstly describes the climate threats for Europe as well as the birth and objectives of the EU climate and energy package adopted in 2009. Then, the different components of this package are highlighted: the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the obligations of the non-ETS sectors, the 20% renewable energy objective, the promotion of carbon capture and storage and the framework on environmental subsidies. Thirdly, the other EU climate policy legislations are examined, comprising: energy efficiency, the GHG emissions of cars, the GHG emissions of fuels, and the Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan). Next, adaptation to climate change is discussed, before examining the international aspects of the EU actions after Copenhagen. As a way of conclusion, the paper assesses the EU climate policy throughout four main questions: What has the EU achieved until now? What will be the costs? What will be the impact on the European Union? And, is the EU action sufficient

The Treaty of Lisbon: A Second Look at the Institutional Innovations

This book examines the institutional innovations that are gradually being introduced as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon